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PEACE MISSIONS AND CIVIL-MILITARY 




The closure of the United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Hai-
ti (MINUSTAH) in October 20173 unleashed a wave of political and academic 
reflections on the legacy of Brazilian participation in this 13-year event which 
mobilized some 37,000 military personnel.
Diplomatically, MINUSTAH was considered by the Brazilian govern-
ment as an important foreign policy instrument that allowed the country to 
play a greater role in the international scenario, especially in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (Amorim 2016) and to qualify itself as a peacemaker to the 
United Nations United Nations (Jungmann 2017). The National Congress, 
which expressed some reluctance to send Brazilian troops to Haiti, especially 
during the appreciation of the Foreign Affairs and Defense ministers’ explan-
atory statement on this matter in 20044, echoed the executive’s official narra-
1 The ideas presented in this article were previously discussed on three occasions, at the XIII 
International Conference of Brazilian Association Studies in 2016, at the IX Congress of the 
Latin American Association of Political Science in 2017 and at the XI Metting of Brazilian 
Political Science Association in 2018.. The Participation in both events was facilitated by the 
project International and Regional Scenarios of Security and Defense: a Civil Military approach, 
funded by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development and the Ministry 
of Defense.
2 Adjunct Professor of the Bachelor on Defense and International Strategic Management of the 
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. PhD in Political Science from the University of São Paulo. 
E-mail: a.a.marques@irid.ufrj.br
3 MINUSTAH was replaced by the United Nations Mission in Support of Justice in Haiti 
(MINUJUSTH) which will aim to support the strengthening of public institutions and the rule 
of law in the country.
4 Okaddo (2017) mapped out the work of the Committee on Foreign Relations and National 
Defense of the Chamber of Deputies (CREDN) on MINUSTAH issues and found that after an 
initial clash between members of the commission opposed to sending Brazilian troops to Haiti 
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tive about the success of the mission (Brazil 2017).
From a military perspective, MINUSTAH allowed Brazilian officers 
and graduates of the three Armed Forces to be immersed in a real operating 
environment. Organizationally, the Joint Center for Peace Operations of Bra-
zil (CCOPAB) benefited directly from the Brazilian experience in Haiti, evolv-
ing from a structure linked to the Brazilian Army to a UN inspection body in 
the accreditation of peacekeeping forces (Teixeira 2017) .
Academic output on peace missions in Brazil has grown exponential-
ly since the country took command of the MINUSTAH military contingent. 
Abdenur, Kuele, Folly and Macedo (2017) found from a survey in the CAPES 
journal portal that 35 books, articles and monographs on peace operations in 
Brazil were produced from 1990 to 2003. In the following period, From 2004 
to 2017, the bibliographic production on the subject reached the mark of 418 
works5. 
The international literature on Brazilian participation in peacekeeping 
operations has also increased significantly in the last decade6 and, with regard 
to the legacy of our troops in Haiti, a particular point concerns the discussion 
that will be made in this article, the so-called Porto - Prince-Rio de Janeiro 
connection (Hirst and Nasser 2014: 04), that is, to what extent does the expe-
rience of the Armed Forces in public order control actions in Brazil influence 
and the ones who supported the initiative of the Brazilian government, CREDN had little to say 
about the performance of Brazilian troops in Haiti.
5 According to Abdenur, Kuelle, Folly and Macedo (2017), the literature produced in Brazil about 
MINUSTAH concentrates on the decision-making process that led the Brazilian government to 
accept military leadership of the mission and in the relations of that decision with the Brazilian 
attempt to expand its soft power, to consolidate a regional leadership position, to strengthen 
the country’s position in South-South cooperation, to oppose the United States, to secure a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council and to present an alternative to the principle 
of Responsibility to Protect present in this organization. Regarding the Brazilian military’s 
performance in Haiti, the national literature focuses on the operational part of the mission, 
the activities that were carried out by the Brazilian troops and what are the possible returns of 
this experience, both in terms of organizational learning for new peace missions and in what 
concerns to the application of this learning in Brazil. This bibliographic survey also highlights 
some tendencies in the production of knowledge about the Brazilian Armed Forces that had 
already been pointed out by Marques and Fuccille (2015), that is, the Brazilian participation in 
MINUSTAH renewed the academic interest about the military apparatus, the new generation 
of studies on this subject are no longer concentrated in the universities of the São Paulo-Rio-
Brasília axis and there are researchers of various levels of academic formation working in an 
integrated manner on international and defense issues.
6 The international literature on Brazilian participation in peace operations, as well as the 
Brazilian literature, is extensive and a bibliographic review on this topic would fall outside the 
scope of this article. Eric Cezne (2016) did a detailed discussion of the international literature 
on Brazil in peace operations in his master’s thesis.
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the performance of Brazilian troops abroad and vice versa? The answer to this 
question is not unanimous and is directly related to another question that 
is much less studied, both in the national literature and in the international 
literature, and which will be discussed next: the interconnections between 
military participation in peace missions and civil-militar relations, in view of 
the increasingly routine participation of the Brazilian Armed Forces in Law 
and Order (GLO) missions and the serious political crisis that the country is 
undergoin
For the elaboration of the article a literature review was carried out, 
concerning the literature that discusses the links between military participa-
tion in peace missions and the relationship between the Armed Forces and 
other sectors of the State in the domestic sphere, the literature that discusses 
civil-military relations in Brazil and the collection of primary sources such as 
government documents, articles published in newspapers and magazines of 
national circulation, and interviews given by the Brazilian Army commander 
and the Brazilian MINUSTAH commanders to press vehicles. In addition, 
twelve semi-structured individual and group interviews7 were held in Brasília 
and Rio de Janeiro with graduates and Brazilian officers from the three Armed 
Forces who participated in peace missions in Angola, Haiti and Lebanon8 and 
in-depth interviews with commanders of MINUSTAH9. 
The article is organized into three sections besides this introduction. 
The second section reviews the international and Brazilian literature that dis-
cusses the connections between a country’s participation in peace missions 
7 All the interviews used as primary sources in this article were carried out within the project 
Transformations of the military profession in Brazil and Argentina: the perspective of the 
Social Sciences, financed by the Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel. 
8 The identities of the interviewees individually or in the focus group were preserved and the 
information obtained in the interviews were used exclusively for academic purposes in the 
project Transformations of the military profession in Brazil and Argentina: the perspective of 
the Social Sciences. The testimonies of the military commanders of MINUSTAH were donated 
to the collection of the Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of 
Brazil of the Getulio Vargas Foundation.
9 The military commanders of MINUSTAH were Army General Heleno Ribeiro Pereira (2004-
2005), General of Division Urano Teixeira da Matta Bacellar (2005-2006), Army General José 
Elito Carvalho Siqueira (2006-2007), General of Division Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (2007-
2009), General of Division Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto (2009-2010), General of Division Luiz 
Guilherme Paul Cruz (2010-2011), General of Division Eduardo Ramos Baptista Pereira ( 2011-
2012), General of Division Fernando Rodrigues Goulart (2012-2013), Army General Edson Leal 
Pujol (2013-2014), General of Division José Luiz Jaborandi Júnior (2014-2015) and General of 
Division Ajax Porto Pinheiro (2015-2017). Two MINUSTAH commanders have already passed 
away, the General of Division Urano Teixeira da Matta Bacellar and the General of Division José 
Luiz Jaborandi Júnior.
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and the stability of civil-military relations, pointing out the limitations of the 
argument which states that the participation in peace missions would have a 
reforming effect on the military institutions of the African and Latin Amer-
ican countries that contribute substantively with troops to the UN and dis-
cusses some specificities of the Brazilian case. The third section maps the 
perceptions of the Brazilian military personnel on the participation in peace 
missions focusing its reflexes for the civil-military relations. Finally, some fi-
nal remarks will be made on this topic.
Peace missions and civil-military relations in the academic 
perspective
Participation in peace missions is one of the main tasks performed 
by the contemporary armed forces10 (Matei 2012). Since the creation of the 
United Nations (UN) in 1945, to date, the number of peace missions under 
the organization’s mandate has increased exponentially, especially after the 
end of the Cold War. In addition, the profile of these missions has changed 
dramatically over the decades. From the first peacekeeping mission in 1948, 
when military observers were sent to the Middle East to monitor the armistice 
agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors, to the controversial deci-
sion of the UN Security Council that authorized the use of an intervention 
brigade with special forces troops and the mission to “neutralize” the armed 
groups in the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Con-
go (MONUSCO) in 201311, there was a significant extension in the scope of 
10 Cristiana Cristiana Matei summarizes the six main tasks performed by the contemporary 
Armed Forces: 1-to wage and be prepared to wage wars, 2- to stand and be prepared to wage 
intrastate wars, 3-counterterrorism, 4-support to police forces in the fight against crime, 5 - 
peace missions, 6- humanitarian assistance (Matei 2012).
11 In this regard, it is worth observing the positions of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
on the mandate of MONUSCO. In the Brazilian case, it is noteworthy that at the beginning 
of MINUSTAH there was some critical positioning of CREDN regarding the use of force by 
Brazilian troops in Haiti in 2013, while the UN debated increasing the use of force by its troops 
to impose peace in the Congo under Chapter VII of its charter, a matter directly of concern 
to Brazil that under the Constitution of 1988 may only participate in peacekeeping missions, 
there was no manifestation of CREDN in that regard. Okado (2017) reports that there was 
also no substantive debate in CREDN about the deployment of Brazilian troops to Lebanon 
in 2010. What is being discussed here is not the convenience of the country participating in 
peace missions but the clear disinterest of CREDN in discussing and supervise the subjects 
related to this topic. The Brazilian legislative erratic behavior in relation to defense issues was 
analyzed by Oliveira (2005) and his diagnosis still remains current. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 
(2007) extend the diagnosis of Oliveira (2005) throughout Latin America when referring to the 
attention deficit of the politicians of the region in relation to the defense policy. The guidelines 
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mandates and substantive changes in the nature of peace operations, which 
need to deal with a large number of technical and care tasks in increasingly 
complex environments
However, despite all these changes, it should be noted that the UN 
General Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld’s observation in the 1950s: “Peace 
operations are not tasks for soldiers but only soldiers can carry them out” 
(Moskos 1976: 139), remains current.
Concerning the participation of US and European troops in peace-
keeping operations, Charles Moskos (1976) argued that military participation 
in peace missions, which were not primarily aimed at eliminating the enemy, 
would bring great benefits to the relationship between the military and other 
sectors of the state and society over time, since such a mission would require 
the military to have a bargaining power that conventional conflicts did not 
contemplate.
Moskos constructed his argument from the ideas exposed by Morris 
Janowitz in his seminal work The Professional Soldier. By analyzing the stra-
tegic context in which US troops could operate during the height of the Cold 
War, Janowitz (1967) warned that the military should be prepared to fight both 
in a nuclear war and in a conventional war of resistance. These two forms of 
war, according to the author, would require the military greater capacity of 
political negotiation and flexibility. As the use of force in international re-
lations had changed significantly, it would be important for the military to 
incorporate into their professional requirements capabilities that until then 
were required only of police forces such as commitment to the minimum use 
of force and the search for stable relations instead of victory:
“The police conception encompasses the entire scope of power in military 
organizations. At the upper end are weapons of mass destruction; those of 
flexible and specialized application are at the lower end, where there are 
also specialists in military aid programs, paramilitary operations, guerrilla 
warfare and counter-guerrilla warfare. Equating the manipulation of weap-
ons of high destructive power with strategy and those of small destructive 
power with tactics has been, and continues to be, a source of profession-
al and public confusion. The police conception recognizes that there are 
strategic and tactical dimensions at each end of the scale. Tactics of stra-
tegic intimidation, for example, require daily decisions that range from 
for CREDN meetings in 2013 can be found at: http://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/
comissoes/comissoes-permanentes/credn/reunioes/pesquisa_reunioes_comissao.
The Brazilian position and of the other South American countries that contribute with troops 
to UN peacekeeping missions were analyzed by Mónica Hirst (2016) in the book La Presencia 
de Argentina en Haiti.
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community relations in overseas bases to the determination of propitious 
moments for political-military declarations of national leaders. On the oth-
er hand, strategic decisions regarding limited warfare involve policies of 
far-reaching consequences regarding the size, control, and distribution of 
military units.
It is no longer possible for officialdom, if it wishes to be organized effec-
tively for strategic intimidation and for limited warfare, to operate on the 
basis of “war” and “peace” premises. As the conception of a police force 
eliminates the distinction between a military establishment of peace and 
war it approaches the concept of policing “(Janowitz 1967, 400).
Decades later, Charles Moskos would call this new profile-negotiating 
professional - whose emergence Janowitz identified during the Cold War - a 
military-statesman, defining him as a qualified officer to deal with the media 
and able to act in the complex environment of diplomacy (Moskos 2000).
In contemporary times, peace missions are the main terrain where the 
diplomatic skills of the military are exercised. Giuseppe Caforio (2007) pre-
sented the results of a series of surveys carried out between the 1990s and the 
beginning of the new millennium with military personnel from the United 
States and some Western European countries. These studies showed that the 
increasing insertion of US and European militaries into multinational troops 
would have a double meaning for the armed forces of these countries: while 
coexistence and exchange of experiences with other military organizations 
would tend to standardize certain organizational behaviors , contact with for-
eign troops would tend to reinforce some traditional values  in multinational 
teams such as patriotism, discipline, sense of responsibility and dedication 
(Caforio 2007).
The results of the surveys carried out by Caforio show that for the 
armed forces of countries with the most robust democracies, the experience 
of operating in multinational troops tends to reinforce some traditional mili-
tary values in the members of the teams, besides contributing to the improve-
ment of new capacities (Caforio 2007). However, one of the main characteris-
tics of contemporary peace missions is the increasing participation of troops 
from Latin American, Asian and African countries, replacing US troops and 
their NATO allies.
At a first moment, the international literature highlighted the positive 
aspects of participating in peace missions in the process of socialization of 
these military, making them more professional and democratic. The contact 
between American and allied troops with troops from countries that had left 
authoritarian regimes and had little international experience would have a 
reforming effect on military institutions and individuals participating in mul-
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tinational teams. This potential reforming effect would also extend to civil-
ian-military relations, helping to reinforce the subordination of these armed 
forces to civilian power in their countries of origin.
According to Michel Desch, participating in peace missions would 
bring great benefit to countries that were undergoing a transition from an au-
thoritarian regime to a democratic regime because it would be easier to con-
trol the military while they were serving on missions abroad (Desch 1999, 12).
This reforming effect of participation in peace missions is also em-
phasized by Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, for whom foreign-oriented military 
would be more professional in the classical sense of the term and would 
tend to become less involved in domestic affairs (Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 
2000).
In a more recent article on accomplishment of military missions in 
Latin America, Pion-Berlin points out that peace missions are a challenge 
for the military because they require them to play a variety of roles. While 
many of these roles are beyond their professional reach, they are still very re-
warding for the Latin American military. There is a prestige factor associated 
with these missions. Participation in peace operations has also been associat-
ed with advanced professional training and the satisfaction of promotion re-
quirements, and many military officials rediscover their purpose by following 
these missions (Pion-Berlin 2012, 637).
Magnus Lundgren elaborates on the arguments put forward by the 
above authors, especially those of Michael Desch, from what he understoods 
to be a rational behavior of the military of poor countries that depend finan-
cially on participating in UN peacekeeping missions to balance their defense 
budgets. According to the author, these military men would avoid ostensible 
acts of military insubordination and coup attempts to continue participating 
in peace missions, since the UN prefers to rely on countries that have stable 
civil-military relations to form their troops (Lundgren 2018).
Maggie Dwyer, in turn, discusses the limitations of the theoretical 
model advocating the reforming effect of participating in peace missions in 
her case study of riots led by UN mission egressed soldiers in West African 
countries. According to the author, there have been at least 10 riots in the 
region since 1991 related to complaints from soldiers who had participated 
in peace missions. The West African countries contribute substantively with 
troops to the UN missions but this seems to have a rather limited effect on 
the reform of African military institutions. The riots studied by Dwyer result 
from an interaction between material grievances and a sense of injustice, and, 
in general, these issues are related to the corruption of officers who lead the 
troops and take an amount of the wage of their subordinates (Dwyer 2015).
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Levin, MacKay, Nasirzadeh and Sealey propose a refinement of the 
democratic peacekeeper’s hypothesis, given the difficulties of generalization 
in early studies discussing the reformist potential of participation in peace-
keeping missions. Relating the reflexions of the participation in peace mis-
sion in the civil-military relations to the type of political regime of the studied 
country, the authors conclude that countries with robust democracies would 
benefit most from participating in peace missions, while authoritarian coun-
tries or fragile democracies would benefit little from this activity. The transfer 
of funds and prestige from the UN to the armed forces of undemocratic or 
politically unstable countries could even potentialize the possibility of a mil-
itary coup in these places, destabilizing them rather than contributing to the 
reform of their military institutions (Levin et al. 2017).
With regard to the literature on Brazilian participation in peace mis-
sions, the analysts’ expectations did not differ from those presented in the 
international literature until the advent of MINUSTAH. Clóvis Brigagão, in a 
1999 text, argued that the new generation of Brazilian soldiers trained after 
participating in peace missions would have a new vision on conflict preven-
tion and civilian governments (Brigagão 1999).
The most recent bibliography on the Brazilian case, especially the 
book by Arturo Sotomayor, The Mith of Democratic Peacekeeper, questions the 
possible reforming effect of the participation of peace missions. For Soto-
mayor, the participation of Brazil in missions of this nature did not have the 
effects expected by the analysts who study the subject. Their argument is that 
the Brazilian military not only replicates but reinforces their organizational 
understandings and domestic practices in the peace missions in which they 
participate. He analyzed the participation of Brazilian troops in Africa and 
Haiti to corroborate his thesis (Sotomayor 2014).
Regarding the participation of Brazilian troops in Mozambique and 
Angola in the 1990s, Sotomayor argues that the Brazilian military saw peace 
missions in Africa as an extension of subsidiary missions, mainly civic-social 
actions (ACISO), which they carried out in the Brazil. The author identifies in 
this perception the influence of the Armed Forces in the Amazon. Regarding 
the preparation of the troops for the missions that would be carried out under 
the mandate of the UN, there was the understanding that the military trained 
to operate in the Amazon would be able to operate in Africa, for this reason a 
large part of the contingent employed in the Verification missions of the Unit-
ed Nations in Angola and in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique 
was recruited in Manaus and elsewhere in the Amazon. The military, accord-
ing to Sotomayor, took to Africa the practices that were considered effective in 
Brazil to deal with the needs of a population living in an environment where 
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the State is present largely through military institutions12 and was little influ-
enced by this international experience. (Sotomayor 2014: 82-84).
In relation to Sotomayor’s argument, it is necessary to consider that 
in the 1990s Brazil did not have a training center for peace operations where 
the organizational experience acquired in Africa could be processed and dis-
seminated in the troops. In addition, the participation of the Brazilian Armed 
Forces in social assistance and development support activities has deep his-
torical roots (D’Áraújo 2010) and has grown significantly since the 2000s 
(Mathias, Campos and Santos 2016) making it difficult to disseminate any 
organizational benefit that the participation in a mission abroad could bring.
Besides, in the case of the troops sent to Haiti, Sotomayor maintains 
that the strategies used by the Brazilian military to pacify the favelas where 
they acted would be the same used in Brazil, so the performance of our troops 
abroad, rather than promoting some kind of institutional reform, would be 
reinforcing the practices adopted in the domestic environment. An example 
of this would be the request of military troops to pacify the favelas of the 
Complexo do Alemão by the governor of Rio de Janeiro Sérgio Cabral. On 
that occasion, Cabral used the performance of Brazilian troops in the favelas 
of Haiti to justify their demand for militarization of public security problems 
in Rio de Janeiro (Sotomayor 2014, 88).
Jorge Zaverucha also questions the thesis of the reforming effect of 
the participation in peace missions. Recovering the lyrics of a famous song by 
Caetano Veloso and Gilberto Gil, Zaverucha states that “Haiti is here” (Zaver-
ucha 2005), that is, Brazilian troops would be training in Haiti to be employed 
in the fight against crime in Brazil and the routine use of military troops to 
combat urban violence in the country would be one of the indicators that de-
mocracy in Brazil is still fragile (Zaverucha 2008).
The Porto Príncipe-Rio de Janeiro connection is at the center of the 
debate over the legacy of Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH. The first 
analysis that deal with the intertwined experiences in the two cases dates back 
to 2014. Besides Sotomayor (2014), Hirst and Nasser drew attention to this 
phenomenon. The authors reported that approximately 60% of the military 
troops employed in the Maré favela in 2010 were formed by egressed from 
MINUSTAH and that Viva Rio projects for the Rio de Janeiro favelas were 
being replicated in Bel Air and Cité Soleil (Hirst and Nasser, 2014). According 
to Sotomayor (2014), Viva Rio was the nongovernmental organization that 
worked more closely with the Brazilians in Haiti.
12 On the material and symbolic importance that the Brazilian military attributes to the 
Amazon see: Marques (2007).
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Kristian Hoelscher and Per Norheim-Martinsen in turn warn for the 
possible undesirable consequences of the routine use of peacekeepers in Law 
and Order Assurance missions. According the authors, the military’s perfor-
mance in Rio de Janeiro favelas intertwines the experience in Haiti with a 
long-standing Latin American military tradition of public order control and 
this could hinder the consolidation of democracy in Brazil (Hoelscher and 
Norheim-Martinsen, 2004).
Siman and Santos (2018) present a similar argument when they ana-
lyze the influence of the binomial security and development in the imaginary 
of the Brazilian military and how this is expressed in the performance of the 
Brazilian troops when they are fulfilling tasks of Guarantee of the Law and the 
Order and participating in missions of peace.
Haring acknowledges the synergistic effects that the two experiences, 
the peacekeeping mission in Haiti and the Law and Order Guarantee mission 
in Rio de Janeiro, have for the troops but concludes that in the near future, 
the organizational learning that the mission in Haiti provided to the Armed 
Forces should be applied in the control of public order in Brazil and not in 
new peace missions as diplomats and military wish (Haring 2016, 158).
An important question pervades all the analysis that discuss the con-
nection or feedback between the Brazilian military’s performance in peace 
missions and in subsidiary missions in Brazil: the greater involvement in 
peace operations did not diminish the participation of the Armed Forces in 
subsidiary activities in the country as predicted by the first studies on this sub-
ject, instead, there was a significant increase in the employment of the troops 
returning from Haiti in Law and Order Guarantee operations.
The tendency towards banalization of the use of the Law and Order 
Guarantee, already criticized by the army commander, General Eduardo Villas 
Bôas (Monteiro 2018), associated with the serious political crisis that Brazil 
has been going through since 2016, with the deposition of President Dilma 
Vana Rousseff, created the conditions for a sui generis situation at the end of 
May 2018. While the federal government for the first time enacted a Law and 
Order Guarantee operation throughout the national territory to unclog the 
federal public thoroughfares and try to resolve the strike of the truck driver’s 
which lasted for several days with serious consequences for the whole country 
(Brazil 2018), part of the truckers on strike included the request for a tempo-
rary military intervention in the list of demands of the category to return to 
work (Betim 2018).
This episode reverberates to some extent the lessons of the interna-
tional literature on the side effects of the participation of politically unstable 
countries in peace missions, but in the Brazilian case some considerations 
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are necessary. When Brazil assumed military command of MINUSTAH, the 
country was living in a period of political stability and the decision to partici-
pate more effectively in UN peace missions was part of a project to expand the 
Brazilian role in the international scenario (Amorim 2016), however, when 
the public security crisis intensified, the good performance of troops in Haiti 
came to be seen by the political class as an important asset for the control 
of public order and the use of Law and Order Guarantee operations became 
more frequent, reinforcing the process of feedback between the missions that 
the Brazilian troops carried out abroad and in national territory.
The deposition of President Dilma Rousseff intensified a reversal of 
expectations regarding the role that the Brazilian Armed Forces should play. 
If even the Rousseff government had at least a project of articulation between 
foreign policy and defense policy, in which the military would orient their mis-
sions each time to defend the interests of the country abroad (Alsina 2017), in 
the Temer government this tendency was interrupted and the Armed Forces 
began to operate routinely in operations to combat crime without the expecta-
tion of a relevant mission abroad13.
Within a framework of democratic stability, there were no visible in-
dicators that the routine use of military troops in Law and Order Assurance 
operations could have a negative effect on the quality of Brazilian democra-
cy, but the intensification of the political crisis placed this possibility in the 
agenda since the degree of political dependence of the Armed Forces in the 
government of Michel Temer only finds a parallel in the government of Jose 
Sarney (1985-1990). Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira defined the pattern of civil-mil-
itary relations in this period as military guardianship:
I have employed the concept of military guardianship to designate a situ-
ation in which a government with a politically fragile partisan and parlia-
mentary support finds in the Armed Forces the prime source of its stability 
at the price of preserving the basic traits of recent military experience: a 
high degree of political autonomy of the military apparatus in defining the 
national strategy; the exercise of the interventory function; a sometimes ex-
tremely dysfunctional, because extremely comprehensive, degree of inter-
ference from military ministers in extra-military matters; the affirmation 
of the Army as the force for regime stability par excellence (Oliveira 1994).
But if the present political conjuncture is similar to the one lived dur-
ing the government of Jose Sarney, it is important to emphasize that the Army 
13 Brazil was expected to send troops to the peacekeeping mission in the Central African 
Republic in 2018 but the Temer government rejected the UN proposal and decided to prioritize 
federal intervention in the area of public security in Rio de Janeiro (Góes 2018).
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today has a different pattern of behavior from that observed at the beginning 
of the New Republic (Oliveira 2005). The current military commander’s dis-
pleasure to assume functions that go beyond the military sphere differs sharp-
ly from the resourcefulness with which General Leônidas Pires Gonçalves 
assumed his tutelary function over the President of the Republic in the 1980s, 
which raises some questions that will be dealt with below.
Peace missions and civil-military relations from the perspec-
tive of the military
In the book The Invention of the Army Celso Castro argues that the 
defense of the Brazilian Amazon against international greed had become an 
important identity element for the Brazilian Army from the 1990s and that 
implied an important doctrinal change. After decades of preparing to primar-
ily combat an internal enemy, the defense of the Amazon was aimed at pre-
paring against an external enemy, which had important consequences for the 
pattern of civil-military relations in the country (Castro 2002).
When Brazil took over the military command of the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), appeared the possibility of us-
ing the Brazilian Armed Forces in an externally oriented mission and inserted 
in a project of the country’s international insertion in Latin America and in 
the Caribbean. In this context, the participation in peace missions could con-
stitute an identity element as important as the Amazon in the 1990s, acting 
as a symbol to mobilize military identity in the 21st century.
Brazil spent more than two decades without sending troops to UN 
missions. After ten years in Suez (1957-1967), the country resumed its par-
ticipation with troops in peacekeeping missions sending troops to Mozam-
bique in 1994. During this hiatus, the nature of peace operations significantly 
changed and the Brazilian military had to adapt to the new times in Brazil and 
in the international scope.
Brazilian participation in peace missions under the United Nations 
mandate grew substantially from the 2000s, especially when Brazil assumed 
command of MINUSTAH in 2004, however, until 2010, Brazil still did not 
have a prepared center for the training of military personnel who would par-
ticipate in peace operations (Teixeira 2017). In the words of a military man 
who participated in the Brazilian contingent in the peacekeeping mission in 
Mozambique in the 1990s:
“(...) we had to relearn what a peace mission meant. We had no memory, 
the last mission had been in Suez in 1967, there was no such center of 
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peace operations today, no lessons learned, no such thing. Our activities 
were based on the instruction books, in what existed for the regular train-
ing of the troop, not specifically for peace operations. We had to make an 
adaptation of what existed for the internal training, that is, of activities that 
were carried out within the country and adapted for peace operations. So, it 
was a reinvention (...) (Interview I 2016)”.
This process of reinvention in the way the Brazilian Armed Forces 
operate abroad was accompanied by administrative measures aimed at inter-
nalizing the procedures and norms in force in the peacekeeping missions, 
which led to changes in the behavior of troops on the ground. In 2005, the 
Peace Operations Training Center was created, which began its activities with 
the task of conducting the preparation of the third Brazilian contingent sent 
to the mission in Haiti, and finally, in 2010, the Joint Peace Operations Center 
of Brazil (CCOPAB), which assumed the mission of preparing Brazilian and 
foreign military and civilians to be sent to peace missions, was created (Teix-
eira 2017).
Concurrent with adapting to the existing international standards in 
peace operations, participation in this type of mission also allows for the abil-
ity of the military involved in them to be tested and to place them on a scale 
that replicates the division of power between countries in the international 
arena.
An officer who was in the first contingent of Brazilians assigned to 
operate in a Spanish brigade reports that at the beginning of the mission they 
were “set aside” and each day they had to prove that they were able to carry out 
the missions “at the European level”. The military attributes the difficulties 
faced by the first contingent in UNIFIL to the lack of Brazilian tradition in 
employing troops in real war operations. And he emphasizes that the stereo-
type of the Brazilian abroad (linked to football, carnival, cordiality, etc.) makes 
it difficult at first to recognize the professional capacity of the Brazilian mili-
tary by the European and American military (Interview II 2016).
The position of Brazil as an intermediate country in the international 
arena is evident when the interviewees compare the perception of Europeans 
about the professional capacity of the Brazilian military with the perception 
that the South American armed forces have on this attribute. A military man 
who headed a combat platoon in the second Brazilian contingent in Haiti 
reports that in the actions he participated in, the military of the other South 
American countries waited and recognized the Brazilian leadership (Inter-
view III 2016).
The above accounts reveal a great affinity between the international 
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identity of Brazil built during the administrations of President Lula da Silva14 
and the experience of the military in international troops: the Brazilian mil-
itary would be representing an emerging country that sought to qualify as a 
peacemaker before the UN.
Regarding the reflexes of the Brazilian military’s participation in 
peacekeeping missions for civil-military relations, it is possible to identify 
that, at first, the decision of the Lula da Silva government to send troops to 
Haiti was seen with distrust for a portion of the officers.
A senior officer working in the Army Land Operations Command 
(COTER) reported that when President Lula (leader of the then largest left-
wing political party in Latin America) decided to accept the UN invitation to 
take military command of the United Nations mission in Haiti this was inter-
preted as an attempt to alienate the Brazilian Armed Forces from its subsidi-
ary activities in the country, since Brazil was still participating, with a smaller 
contingent, in the East Timor peace mission (Interview IV 2016).
In this context, sending troops to missions in two distant places 
seemed to be part of a strategy of the Workers’ Party government to try to 
control the military by keeping them on missions abroad as prescribed by 
Michael Desch (1999). But this initial perception soon faded. In the course 
of time it became clear that in the PT governments the Armed Forces would 
continue to act systematically in subsidiary missions in the national territory 
(Mathias, Campos and Santos 2016) without losing their capacity of influence 
and prestige with a portion of Brazilian society, as was evident during the 
truck drivers’ strike in May 2018.
Moreover, the routine performance of the armed forces in subsidiary 
activities is not seen as an important asset by the Brazilian political class alone. 
The recruitment process of the generals who commanded the MINUSTAH 
military contingent shows that the prior experience of these professionals in 
Law and Order Guarantee operations, in combating transnational crimes and 
in humanitarian assistance actions is also appreciated by the UN.
With the exception of General Heleno Pereira, who was the first Brazil-
ian force commander in Haiti15, the other generals who succeeded him went 
through a process of selection in the UN where the capacity to deal with situa-
tions of a police and political nature, that extrapolate the military sphere, was 
14 In this regard see: Amorim (2016).
15 General Heleno Pereira was the only name indicated by the Brazilian government to assume 
the military command of MINUSTAH but this is not the practice in force in the UN. The 
organization’s rules foresee that the country indicates some professionals and the UN select 
the one that it considers more qualified to assume the function.
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measured. General Ajax Pinheiro, the last MINUSTAH force commander, 
reports that in his interview with UN officials, before taking command of the 
mission, he sought to relate the experience he had in charge of the Brigade in 
Cascavel with the activities he would carry out in Haiti. Pinheiro 2018).
The selective process of force commanders for MINUSTAH reveals 
that the very nature of the mission contributed greatly to reinforcing the Porto 
Príncipe-Rio de Janeiro connection. However, a point in common permeates 
the discourse of all the Brazilian generals who have been in Haiti. When asked 
if it was more appropriate for the Armed Forces to use what they learned in 
Haiti in Law and Order Guarantee operations or other peace missions, they 
all assert that MINUSTAH’s learning should be replicated in other peace mis-
sions rather than in Brazil. In the view of the force commanders, the frequent 
use of military troops to combat crime is a sign that the country has serious 
problems in the area of  public security and must overcome them through the 
improvement of police institutions.
In an interview to the Piauí magazine, General Villas-Bôas defined 
his perception of the use of the army in the favela complex of Maré, where a 
significant portion of the military contingent that was in Haiti was employed:
“It was eleven o’clock in the morning or noon of a normal day. And our peo-
ple, very attentive, very worried, very uptight and armed, were patrolling 
the street where women and children were passing. I said, ‘We are a sick 
society. The Army is pointing guns at Brazilians.’ This is terrible (Victor 
2018).” 
This interview was granted after the federal government decided to 
intervene in the area of  public security in the state of Rio de Janeiro at the 
beginning of 2018, so it is not possible to state that the federal intervention 
has modified the negative perception of the Brazilian Army regarding the ba-
nalization of the Law and Order Guarantee operations. On the other hand, it 
is possible to affirm that the banalization of the operations of Guarantee of the 
Law and the Order shows conclusively how much President Temer depends 
politically of the support of the Armed Forces to govern.
Final Remarks
The increasingly frequent use of the Armed Forces in Law and Order 
Guarantee operations in Brazil requires a more structured reflection on the 
existing connections between the participation of Brazilian troops in peace 
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operations and in subsidiary activities in the country. Recent literature analyz-
ing Brazilian performance in peace missions offers some interesting insights 
into the consequences of this cross-over experience for civil-military relations.
The benefits of Brazil’s participation in peace missions are undenia-
ble. However, the way the political class has been processing this experience 
is troubling. There is a clear reversal of expectations regarding the role that 
the Brazilian Armed Forces should play in a country that intends to take a 
leading role in its strategic surroundings. Rather than contributing to the im-
provement of the articulation between foreign policy and defense policy, the 
participation of Brazilian troops in peace operations has contributed to the 
militarization of public security and the policialization of the armed forces.
The high degree of dependence of the Temer government on military 
institutions can also trigger a process of politicization of the armed forces, re-
versing a pattern of civil-military relations being built since Fernando Collor’s 
presidency through institutional reforms such as the decrease of the min-
istries occupied by the military and the creation of the Ministry of Defense 
(Oliveira 2005).
It is hoped that the next governments will use the military apparatus 
more cautiously and in consonance with the interests of Brazilian society. The 
consequences of the political use of the armed forces have been well studied 
in the literature that analyzed the military dictatorship in the country (Oliveira 
1994) and are known to be disastrous for the society, for the political class and 
for the military institutions.
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ABSTRACT
The article discusses the interconnections between the participation of the Brazilian 
military in peace missions and civil-military relations in the country. For its elaboration 
a bibliographical revision and the collection of primary sources, like governmental 
documents, articles published in newspapers and magazines and interviews were 
realized. It is concluded that, instead of contributing to the improvement of the 
articulation between foreign policy and defense policy, the Brazilian participation 
in peace operations has been instrumentalised by the political class and indirectly 
contributing to the militarization of public security and the policialization of the 
armed forces.
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